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Political Transcripts by Federal Document Clearing House

DOD Briefings, Senate Hearings:

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DEFENSE DEPARTMENT NEWS BRIEFING - April 18, 2001

Puerto Rican Pols Are Pataki's Patsies

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REGULAR NEWS BRIEFING - March 27, 2001

INHOFE HAILS STRONG PRO-NAVY SENTIMENT ON VIEQUES

U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HOLDS A HEARING ON MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ON MILITARY READINESS

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DEFENSE DEPARTMENT NEWS BRIEFING

SPEAKER: REAR ADMIRAL CRAIG QUIGLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PUBLIC AFFAIRS

April 18, 2001
M2 Presswire
Copyright © 2001 M2 Communications, Ltd. All Rights Reserved.

Rear Adm. Craig Quigley: Yeah, Chris?

Q: A Vieques question. What are the plans for training on Vieques in late April and the Enterprise battle group?

Quigley: We have notified the secretary of state of Puerto Rico of our intention to train for about a week, commencing on the 27th of April.

Q: Using the Inner Range?

Quigley: Yes, and inert ordnance, of course.

Quigley: Yes.

Q: No, back to Vieques , please.

Quigley: One more, Charlie, if you -- yes, go ahead.

Q: Okay. Today the governor of Puerto Rico is quoted in the local press as saying "what agreement?" Basically, she says there's no agreement because there's never been a document signed by two people. Does the department --

Quigley: Sure there has.

Q: Could you amplify --

Quigley: I believe it was the -- I think it was Mr. Morey, the secretary of state of the Commonwealth at the time, Secretary Cohen, Secretary Danzig, I believe there were several signers of the agreement which then became law, federal law, and was endorsed by the legislature of the Commonwealth as well. So, yeah, it was signed.

Q: Does the department consider that there is an agreement in place regarding Vieques ?

Quigley: Yes. Yes, indeed. That is our -- that is our desire, that the agreed-upon way ahead is found in that agreement and we intend to abide by it, and we hope the governor does as well.

Q: Well, at some point, if the governor, in your judgment, is in violation of the agreement, would the department then consider -- no longer consider itself bound and be free to go back to live ordnance?

Quigley: That's a complex -- that is a more complex question than it sounds.

Q: (Off mike.)

Quigley: You're going to have to -- you're going to have to take a look at the entire federal government and work that through the inter-agency, Dale, to get an answer to that questions, and then determine the way ahead from there.

Q: But it sounds cliche, an agreement requires two people. I mean, you need two to tango. So, if one party considers that there's no agreement, and what point does the federal government say this agreement or this document is null and void?

Quigley: Well, it all centers on actions, not words. There are actions that are spelled out in the agreement between the commonwealth and the federal government, and they are law enforcement activities, agreement on the part of the Navy to not use live ordnance. It's a variety of elements that are contained in the agreement. And as long as the elements of the agreement are complied with over time, then the agreement would remain in force.

Q: Well, calling on the law enforcement, I know the security of the range has been an issue. There has been exchange of correspondence between Navy officials and the government. The Navy has recorded numerous incidents in which the security of the range has been violated and the safety of the sailors and others --

Quigley: Those security forces there, mmm hmm.

Q: -- have also been. Do you have an account of those incidents, because the governor of Puerto Rico only claims one or two minor incidents?

Quigley: Well, that's something that we hope to discuss with the Puerto Rican law enforcement authorities to make sure that we're talking about apples and apples and that our understandings are the same.

Q: Is the governor -- if you're planning on conducting training at the end of this month, and the government of Puerto Rico doesn't provide the law enforcement that you would need to conduct the training, are you going to send other federal officials, either marshals or some other security forces to provide security of the perimeter and the range?

Quigley: I can't speculate as to how we might do that.

Q: Thank you.

Q: Congressmen --

Q: Thank you!

Q: Congressmen Hansen and Stokes have written to the president saying that basically no agreement is existing. I mean, there's a -- you know, it doesn't exist, therefore, (inaudible) to be able to renegotiate to get back to live fire. Is the department considering measures to get back to live fire?

Quigley: Again, as I said before, there is an agreement in place. Our intentions are to abide by the terms of the agreement, and we would hope that the commonwealth would do the same.

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CITY POWER / Puerto Rican Pols Are Pataki's Patsies

by Howard Jordan
Howard Jordan is a professor of public administration at Hostos Community College
and a weekly columnist for the Spanish daily Hoy.

April 18, 2001
Copyright ©2001 Newsday Inc. All Rights Reserved.

IF YOU ASKED a New Yorker who isn't Puerto Rican , "What's your position on the U.S. military's bombing of Vieques?" he or she might answer, "I'd prefer mayonnaise on my sandwich."

But to more than five million Puerto Ricans of every political stripe, the use of this Puerto Rican island as a U.S. Navy bombing range strikes at the heart of our national identity. Ending the bombing has become a symbol of the Puerto Rican people's noble struggle for the right of self-determination against American colonialism.

That is precisely why Gov. George Pataki's decision to play the "Puerto Rican card" by aligning himself with the movement to "Stop the Bombing of Vieques " is a stroke of political genius. It is an opportunity to win points with the overwhelmingly Democratic Puerto Rican vote in the Empire State. While Pataki says he wants to stop the bombs that fall on Vieques , he continues the policies of economic bombardment that threaten to devastate Puerto Rican barrios.

Speaking about Vieques the governor recently stated, "I'm hopeful that we will be able to continue our efforts to convince the administration that with almost 10,000 residents, with parents trying to raise families, Vieques is not the place for live bombing and live ammunition to be used."

The governor recently toured Vieques with Puerto Rican Gov. Sila Calderon and a delegation of high-profile stateside Puerto Ricans such as State Sen. Olga Mendez (D-Manhattan), Assemb. Jose Rivera (D- Bronx), state Health Commissioner Antonia Novello and labor leader Dennis Rivera, who praised Pataki's leadership on this issue.

As Jose Rivera remarked, "Who cares from where or what party the support is coming from as long as that person wants to stop the abusive treatment of Vieques by the U.S. military."

What is wrong with this scenario of Democratic Puerto Ricans coqueteando (flirting) with a Republican governor?

First, while Pataki can press for the cessation of the Navy bombardment, his influence on this federal issue is limited. Who knows if he carries any weight with the Bush administration. Right before Easter, Puerto Rican government officials were notified by the Navy that it plans to resume holding war games on Vieques .

Second, the rationale offered by the Puerto Rican leaders for their embrace of Pataki is two-faced and short-sighted. They argue that they went with Pataki because the Clinton administration failed to sign an agreement to stop the bombing of Vieques . Although criticism of Clinton is right on target, it is precisely these same Puerto Rican "leaders" who spent the last eight years dancing salsa with the Clinton administration, kissing up to (now) Senadora Hillary Clinton, and telling us about the evils of a George W. Bush presidency.

Why haven't these Democrats insisted on accountability from Sen. Clinton, who is vacationing in the Dominican Republic while the Navy is set to resume bombing in Vieques? And what about Sen. Charles Schumer? Or gubernatorial candidates Carl McCall and Andrew Cuomo? Rest assured these political chameleons will now realign themselves with the Democratic political establishment of New York and begin to spout the predictable attacks on the Republican boogeyman. This hypocrisy and double-dealing of Puerto Rican "leadership" in the name of the so-called greater good is what has most New Yorkers cynical about the political process.

Let us really look at Gov. Pataki's record in New York State, where more than 1.3 million Puerto Ricans reside. Responding to private interests Pataki has tried to gut the Superfund, which seeks to hold private corporations accountable for damaging the environment. The governor would seek to protect the people of Vieques from environmental damage while allowing New Yorkers to fall prey to pollution. This is perhaps one reason why the Bronx has one of the highest rates of asthma in the state.

Add to this scenario the Republican governor's push for privatization of public schools, the attacks on CUNY and SUNY, the support of the death penalty, the end of parole, the failure to counter racial profiling of Latino youth, and Pataki's policies offer as dim a prospect for the future of the Puerto Rican community as does the bombing of Vieques .

In this modern day David vs. Goliath saga, the key to stopping the bombing of Vieques is in Puerto Ricans' convincing all decent Americans that the fight to end a policy that has 10,000 U.S. citizens of Vieques living in terror must hold the same priority in their hearts as did the return of the American spy-plane crew from China. The solution does not lie in a Puerto Rican leadership that gives lip service to Gov. Pataki in his political pandering.

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DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REGULAR NEWS BRIEFING

SPEAKER: REAR ADMIRAL CRAIG QUIGLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PUBLIC AFFAIRS

March 27, 2001
Copyright © 2001 Federal Document Clearing House. All Rights Reserved.

QUIGLEY: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

QUESTION: On training, the USS Enterprise battle group is scheduled to be deployed to the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf sometime end of April. Has a final decision been made that that battle group is going to use the inner range at Vieques?

QUIGLEY: No.

QUESTION: Congressman Curt Weldon has written to the secretary proposing St. Kitts and Nevis as alternatives to Vieques . Are they really seriously being considered as alternative sites for training for the Atlantic fleet?

QUIGLEY: Well, the secretary has received the congressman's letter, and a response is being prepared. But I don't think he has responded to him directly yet.

QUESTION: OK. But is the congressman's proposal under serious consideration by the department in the search for alternative training to Vieques ?

QUIGLEY: I think that the answer to the letter will show that we have considered his suggestion, and we'll answer the suggestion specifically.

QUESTION: The March 9 report that was due to the president on how the Navy was going to conduct its training through May 1, 2003, has that been finally submitted to the White House?

QUIGLEY: No, it has not. They know it's not there yet. We've told them that it's late. We are trying to determine a more comprehensive way ahead on Vieques -- that long-range training schedule will be a part of that -- and trying to incorporate that as part of a larger package on the way ahead to Vieques .

QUESTION: Could you elaborate a little more on what you mean by more comprehensive package on Vieques?

QUIGLEY: Well, the report that was called for was simply a listing of the training requirements for battle groups and amphibious ready groups through 2003. That's a pretty simplistic package to put together, but the issue is much more complex. We're trying to be able to come to a solution to the training needs, not only of the Enterprise battle group that you mentioned earlier, but downstream training needs as well, as part of a comprehensive program on the way ahead on Vieques , involving land transfers, money, use of the range, how often, with what ordnance, under what conditions.

It's very complex. It took a year to come up with the original agreement. It's taking a while longer than we would have liked, probably, to prepare what we are working on right now and will ultimately move forward as a proposal.

QUESTION: Do you consider that the existing agreement is still valid or in place?

QUIGLEY: That is our working assumption. That's a starting point, yes.

QUESTION: In Vieques , there have been -- there's a group of citizens, at least 1,780 individuals, who have signed petitions to have Vieques secede from Puerto Rico . They had meetings in Congress last week. Some of these people are being actually harassed by other anti-Navy sympathizers in Vieques . They claim that they're being physically attacked and under surveillance by the anti-Navy groups. Is the department concerned about security on the range and for those people in Vieques who might support the Navy's stance?

QUIGLEY: Well, we would always be concerned about security on the range. But I would think it would be incumbent upon the civil law enforcement officials within Puerto Rico if that any citizen of the Commonwealth feels threatened for whatever reason.

QUESTION: Just to follow this for a second, is part of this review the -- also involve the status of other military facilities in Puerto Rico ? Is that being discussed as part of this way ahead?

QUIGLEY: Not that I'm aware of. No, not that I'm aware of. That really isn't the issue.

Q: Yes, on training, the USS Enterprise Battle Group is scheduled to be deployed to the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf sometime the end of April. Has a final decision been made if that battle group is going to use the inner range in Vieques?

QUIGLEY: No.

Q: Congressman Curt Weldon has been in to the secretary proposing Saint Kitts and Nevis as alternatives to Vieques . Are they really seriously being considered as alternative sites for training for the Atlantic Fleet?

QUIGLEY: Well, the secretary has received the congressman's letter and a response is being prepared, but I don't think he has responded to him directly, yet.

Q: Okay, but is his proposal -- or the congressman's proposal under serious consideration by the department in the search for alternative training to Vieques ?

QUIGLEY: I think that the answer to the letter will show that we have considered his suggestion and will answer the suggestion specifically.

Q: The March 9th report that was due to the president on how the Navy was going to conduct its training through May 1st, 2003, has that been finally submitted to the White House?

QUIGLEY: No, it has not. They know it's not there yet. We've told them that it's late. We are trying to determine a more comprehensive way ahead on Vieques . That long-range training schedule will be a part of that and trying to incorporate that as part of a larger package on the way ahead to Vieques .

Q: Could you elaborate a little more what you mean by a more comprehensive package on Vieques ?

QUIGLEY: Well, the report that was called for was simply a listing of the training requirements for battle groups and amphibious ready groups through 2003. That's a pretty simplistic package to put together. But the issue is much more complex. We're trying to be able to come to a solution to the training needs not only of the Enterprise battle group that you mentioned earlier, but downstream training needs as well as part of a comprehensive program on the way ahead on Vieques involving land transfers, money, use of the range, how often, with what ordnance, under what conditions. It's very complex. It took a year to come up with the original agreement. It's taking a while longer than we would have liked probably to prepare what we are working on right now and will ultimately more forward as a proposal.

Q: Do you consider that this existing agreement is still valid or in place?

QUIGLEY: That is our working assumption. That's a starting point, yes.

Q: In Vieques, there has been this group of citizens, I believe (inaudible number) individuals who have signed petitions to have Vieques secede from Puerto Rico. They had meetings in Congress last week. Some of these people are being actually harassed by other anti-Navy sympathizers in Vieques.

They claim that they're being, you know, physically attacked and under surveillance by the anti-Navy groups. Is the department concerned about security on the range -- on the range and for those people in Vieques who might support the Navy's stance?

QUIGLEY: Well we would always be concerned about security on the range. But I would think it would be incumbent upon the civil law enforcement officials within Puerto Rico if any citizen of the commonwealth feels threatened for whatever reason.

Dale, you had --

Q: (Inaudible.)

Q: Yeah, just to follow this for a second. Is part of this review also involve the status of other military facilities in Puerto Rico? Or is that being discussed as part of --

QUIGLEY: Not that I'm aware of, no. Not that I'm aware of. It's really -- that really isn't the issue.

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INHOFE HAILS STRONG PRO-NAVY SENTIMENT ON VIEQUES
Sees Sharp Difference Between Vieques Residents and Puerto Rican Politicians

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

March 22, 2001
Copyright © 2001 Federal Document Clearing House. All Rights Reserved.

WASHINGTON-U.S. Sen. James M. Inhofe (R-Okla.) today welcomed strong new evidence that there is substantial support among the residents of Vieques in favor of the continuation of the U.S. Navy live-fire training on the island.

Speaking at today`s hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on military operations and readiness, Inhofe introduced Luis E. Sanchez, the leader of a pro-Navy group on Vieques, who presented the Committee with 1,780 pro-Navy petitions signed by registered Vieques voters. The petitions supported political independence for the municipality of Vieques outside the jurisdiction of the Puerto Rican government.

``Having traveled to Vieques, it has struck me that the residents of that municipality-who are most directly affected by the military training range--are much more supportive of the Navy than are the politicians in Puerto Rico. These petitions clearly demonstrate that there is strong pro-Navy sentiment on the island of Vieques. I am happy to welcome Mr. Sanchez and his colleagues and to help them communicate this important message to Congress and the American people.``

``The people of Vieques should be provided with the opportunity for self - determination . I will bring it forward in the Congress.``

Inhofe is chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness and a leading advocate of the continuation of live-fire training on Vieques as essential to U.S. military readiness. Last year he played a lead role in crafting legislation providing for a referendum to be held among the citizens of Vieques to determine the future of the Navy`s presence on the island.

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U.S. SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HOLDS A HEARING ON MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

SPEAKERS: U.S. SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA), CHAIRMAN U.S. SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE (R-OK)

U.S. SENATOR CARL LEVIN (D-MI), RANKING MEMBER

WITNESSES: GENERAL JOSEPH W. RALSTON, USAF COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE

GENERAL TOMMY R. FRANKS COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

March 22, 2001
Copyright © 2001 Federal Document Clearing House. All Rights Reserved.

WARNER: The hearing will come to order.

INHOFE: In the case of the USS Truman, did they go through the Vieques training?

FRANKS: Vieques ? Yes, sir, they did.

INHOFE: With inert?

FRANKS: With inert, yes, sir.

INHOFE: What is your feeling about inert versus live ordnance?

FRANKS: Senator, as a matter of fact, we also -- in all of our training areas, we will use sometimes inert only and sometimes a combination of live -- in this case, Mark 82 bombs or inert bombs. And so, the preference is to use the live munitions when we can. And I think that is responsive to your question. But my experience has been that the other munitions also provide great training value.

INHOFE: Well, we had a hearing before my subcommittee two days ago on encroachment. And of course, Vieques is the poster child for that kind of a problem.

And all of them came forward and said that in the cases of the Marines, the expeditionary units as well as the live Navy support fire and the ability to use our pilots was absolutely necessary, and it did affect the quality of it.

And I just kind of want to get your perspective...

FRANKS: And I agree with that. I think there's a place for both inert and live, but obviously, the most realistic training we get is with live munitions.

INHOFE: Fine, thank you very much.

WARNER: Senator, I want to thank you. I was going to follow along that line of questioning because as soon as I heard of this tragic accident on that bombing range, the first thing that occurred to me was whether or not that accident could in some way be traced back to the, what we understand as a, shrinking ability of the Navy to properly train the deploying units to that region to face the rigors of the combat in which the aviators, certainly, and, to some extent, others are immediately injected.

And you said, of course, the Truman got the inert training. Was it a full range of inert training, or was that even curtailed?

FRANKS: Sir, I can't answer the question. I'm not sure what the full breadth of the training they received in Vieques was, but I know that they were able to do close air support, and I know that they did use inert munitions as they did their training.

WARNER: What about the next carrier task force being deployed? What's the status of that training?

FRANKS: That training is not going to be done in Vieques , as I understand it from information that I read this morning.

WARNER: That's my understanding also, Senator, so I think, Senator Inhofe, these are matters that you're going to have bear down on in your readiness.

INHOFE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Franks, earlier in this hearing, I brought up the fact that you are responsible for the quality of training of those individuals who show up in the Persian Gulf and, many times, in a combat environment. And from the East Coast deployment, when our battle groups go, we have learned some time ago that there is only one place where you can get the integrated live training to give them that degree of competency to carry out those missions. That is the island of Vieques . And because of the problems that have come up, starting about a year ago, we have been inhibited from having the freedom to carry on the live fire training onthis island, on this land, that is owned by the United States Navy.

In fear that we would lose this, I took the time to go around the world, look at every possible alternative source, including Capo Teulada and Cape Wrath and all the rest of them. And there is none. In fact, they're becoming fewer and fewer as each month goes by.

For that reason, I've spent quite a bit of time in Puerto Rico and then actually on the island of Vieques .

INHOFE: A lot of people don't realize, Mr. Chairman, that Vieques is a municipality of Puerto Rico . It's not a separate system. It is a town. But it is an island.

I had the occasion to go over to the island and actually visit with the citizens. And I did this, Mr. Chairman, for one very significant reason. And that is that I had heard all the opposition from the politicians on Puerto Rico , but I hadn't heard from the citizens who were directly affected who lived on the island of Vieques .

Let's keep in mind there are 9,300 residents in Vieques . Of that, there'd be something less than 4,000 registered voters in Vieques . The way the law is currently structured, it's very likely that there could be a referendum as to whether or not they want the Navy to continue live fire.

Obviously, if it turned out the wrong way, our presence and our activity on the whole island of Puerto Rico would be diminished. But, I think it's very significant to -- Mr. Chairman, as I introduce you to the group out in the hall -- to recognize that in my trips to Vieques , I have met with these citizens only to find that the majority of the citizens on the island of Vieques that would be directly affected, not the politicians in Puerto Rico , but the citizens like the Navy, by and large. They recognize the Navy needed some improvement. They have improved their relationships. They are satisfied with it. They recognize the economic benefit to the people of Vieques .

And I was hoping that they would be invited then to come here to the United States, to Washington, so that we would be able to see what the real people on Vieques want. I have five people here. The leader of the delegation, Mr. Chairman, is Louis Sanchez (ph). I met with these people on the island of Vieques . They explained to me...

WARNER: Senator, I think it'd be important that they came down.

LEVIN: Would you come forward at this point?

And if you'd take your -- you have all of your petitions with you? If you'd come forward to this side of the table so we can see you as I saw you in Vieques .

And the second gentleman there is Louis Sanchez (ph), who's kind of the leader of the group. And these are all citizens. They are carrying with them, Mr. Chairman, over 1,700 petitions, signatures of registered voters on the island of Vieques . On those, they have listed the names, addresses and Social Security numbers and registration of all 1,700.

As you can see, this almost constitutes a majority of everyone who lives on the island of Vieques .

And I thought it was significant that since I couldn't get anyone to listen to me back here on what the people of Vieques , as opposed to the politicians in Puerto Rico , that they come forward and show this. If you'd just put those on the table there, and I'm not sure whether it would be in order or not -- Mr. Chairman, I'd defer to you on that. But, if you would like to hear from any of them or if you'd like to ask questions of these individuals.

WARNER: No. I think that you and I should first indicate that a copy of one of these will be incorporated in today's record, which clearly indicates that there is a very substantial number of the citizens of Vieques who support the ongoing Naval operations that existed when I was Secretary of the Navy many, many, many years ago, 30-plus years ago, and which training is so essential, as General Franks has recounted today to preparing elements of the Navy and the Marine Corps for going into harm's way. But this is a clear manifestation of the desire of those people to work with the United States government and, particularly, our military, to, I think, resume that training as it was performed for these many years.

INHOFE: Mr. Chairman, I know that when you were Secretary of the Navy, you had an appreciation for what was going on over there. But, let me clarify. It's much more significant than just these individuals - 1,700-plus - are supportive of the Navy.

All of these people are signing petitions saying, if necessary, they would secede from Puerto Rico and become a separate entity and vote themselves out so that they would be able to do what has been taking place since 1950 in terms of supporting the Navy and offering us the kind of training to give us the quality that we need in that war-torn region of the Persian Gulf.

INHOFE: I think it would be significant, Mr. Chairman, if each one gave the reporter his name, so that we would be able to properly enter them into the record.

WARNER: Fine. You just write that on a piece of paper, our court reporter will see that that's done.

Now, senator, I think what we're going to do, unless there are further comments from yourself or our other colleagues, Senator Levin and I are recommending that this committee stop this portion of the hearing. We will resume a classified section in 222 Russell immediately.

RALSTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FRANKS: Thank you very much.

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IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ON MILITARY READINESS

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL EDWARD HANLON JR.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON

BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

March 20, 2001
Copyright © 2001 Federal Document Clearing House. All Rights Reserved.

Chairman Inhofe, Senator Akaka, and distinguished members of the Committee, it is my privilege to report on the effect encroachment is having on the readiness of your Marine Corps. On behalf of the Marine Corps, I want to thank the Committee for its continued support. Your efforts reveal not only a commitment to ensuring the common defense, but also a genuine concern for the welfare of our Marines and their families.

Your Marines` success on the battlefield depends on having assured access to training ranges and installations on the land, sea, air and the communications spectrums. However, our ability to train effectively is being slowly eroded by encroachment on many fronts. Urbanization, increasing environmental restrictions; competition with civilian demands for airspace, land, sea space, and radio frequencies threaten the long-term, sustained use of Marine Corps bases and ranges. Encroachment is a serious and growing challenge. Solutions are possible--we can achieve balance between military readiness, encroachment pressures, and stewardship responsibilities.

ISSUES AND TRENDS

Encroachment on our installations comes in many forms, but generally falls within three categories: environmental regulation, community complaints about noise from military activities, and attempts by civilian authorities to use air, land, sea and the communication spectrum dedicated to military activities. In short, the root cause of encroachment is increasing population and urbanization pressures around our bases, stations, and ranges.

While encroachment inexorably shrinks our training ranges, the military is faced with the need to introduce and train with new weapons systems possessing increased stand-off, survivability, and lethality capabilities. The training demand on our bases is already high, because there are fewer training facilities than in the past, partly due to base closures and realignments around the nation and overseas. Our bases and their tenant forces have experienced both successes and failures in managing encroachment. We`d like to share a few of those with you.

IMPACT ON READINESS

Our bases are the platforms where we train our Marines, and from which we launch our Marine Air Ground Task Force 9MAGTFs). We need the sea, land, and air and the flexibility to use them. We would like to take this opportunity to cover with you some of the training challenges your Marines face on a daily basis as a result of encroachment.

Fundamental to the success of Marine Corps operations are the concepts of expeditionary maneuver warfare and combined arms. The employment of naval surface fires, air, artillery, mortar, and direct fire weapons in conjunction with maneuver is essential to the effectiveness of the MAGTF. The most significant effect is the restriction on our MAGTFs, in partnership with the Navy, to train as a single, cohesive entity. They are forced to train piecemeal, separated by time and distance; often never ``tying it all together`` prior to deploying.

No where is this more evident than at MCB Camp Lejeune following the 1999 restrictions on training on Vieques Island Puerto Rico --a vital training facility used to ensure the readiness of deploying Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) and their Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs). Since the range facility was closed in 1999, the East Coast ARG/MEUs have been unable to conduct a live-fire Supporting Arms Coordination Exercise due to the lack of live-fire naval surface fire support (NSFS). Without the Vieques training, the MEU loses the opportunity to coordinate live-fire NSFS, an important piece of the integration package between the Carrier Battle Group (CVBG), Amphibious Squadron, and MEU. The January 31, 2000 Presidential Directive limits training on Vieques to inert ordnance. The 22d MEU did train on Vieques in October 2000 with inert ordnance to include inert artillery and mortars but, it was not the same. Live-fire training is essential to maintaining the readiness of Navy and Marine Corps forces.

Vieques is the only location on the East Coast that can support live fire training and maneuver on the scale necessary to maintain MAGTF combat readiness. MEUs have resorted to sending their NSFS personnel to train in Scotland with CVBGs enroute to the Mediterranean without the benefit of coordinating the training and application of fires with the rest of the ARG and MEU. As a result, ARGs and MEUs train in an environment that does not support combined arms operations prior to deployment.

MCB Camp Lejeune is the only location available for East Coast Marine Corps units to conduct amphibious operations. Sensitive habitat for all nine endangered species occupies five percent of the base's training area. Though, at a glance, this appears to be insignificant, it is not the amount of area that is of concern, it is the locations. The beach is also sensitive habitat. During nesting season, units are restricted to administrative offloads and traversing narrow lanes that have been hand-cleared of turtle eggs. Once off the beach, the remaining forms of sensitive habitat are astride roads leading to training and maneuver areas, and live-fire ranges. This hinders the ability of units to maneuver their vehicles in a tactical and realistic fashion. Because of the artificialities and canalization created by these restrictions, the advantages gained by force-on- force or freeplay exercises are greatly degraded. The limits to unrestricted movement and freeplay result in an inability to properly develop the decision-making skills of leaders at all levels, most severely the junior leadership, the future leaders of your Corps. Additionally, live-fire attacks with air, artillery and mortars in support of maneuvering forces cannot be conducted aboard MCB Camp Lejeune. These training restrictions and hindrances on Vieques and Camp Lejeune prevent our East Coast MAGTFs from the opportunity conducing realistic, meaningful training in combined arms and amphibious operations prior to deployment.

While simulation can be used to enhance combat performance, it cannot replicate or replace live fire. Technology has yet to produce a mechanism to simulate the complex, end-to-end series of procedures associated with preparing and launching live weapons, then assessing the results in a training environment. Likewise, the handling and use of live ammunition, with the resultant psychological impact cannot be replicated by simulation. This holds true for the training of the individual Marine as well as the entire MAGTF.

CONCLUSION

Today`s world situation, combined with our mandate to be a force in readiness, highlights the need for a properly trained Marine Corps. The Corps will continue to focus its efforts on the strength of its Marine Air Ground Task Forces. However, to meet tomorrow`s challenges and maintain your expeditionary force in readiness, will require the ability to train Marines during peace the way we will fight in war.

We have spoken today about the need for fundamental recognition of our unique mission and military land use needs, our stewardship, our contributions to our local regions, and our vital role in the National defense. The Marine Corps takes great pride in its care of the environment and natural resources in its trust. We have achieved a fine record of stewardship. In light of that record, the Marine Corps needs support of its unique requirements considered by all levels of government when developing and implementing federal statutes, as well as local, state, and federal land use and air space policies and practices. In recognizing those needs, I am confident that we can achieve and maintain the appropriate balance between military readiness and competing demands for scarce resources.

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